Canadian Military History
Volume 13

Issue 3

Article 5

2004

The HARIKARI Club: German Prisoners of War and the Mass
Escape Scare of 1944-45 at Internment Camp Grande Ligne,
Quebec
Martin Auger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Martin Auger "The HARIKARI Club: German Prisoners of War and the Mass Escape Scare of 1944-45 at
Internment Camp Grande Ligne, Quebec." Canadian Military History 13, 3 (2004)

This Canadian War Museum is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier.
For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

: The HARIKARI Club: German Prisoners of War and the Mass Escape Scare

The HARIKARI Club

German Prisoners of War and the Mass
Escape Scare of 1944-45 at Internment
Camp Grande Ligne, Quebec
Martin F. Auger

A

t approximately 0200 hours on
Saturday, 5 August 1944, a strange
bugle sound resounded in one of the
compounds of prisoners of war (POW)
Camp No.12 in Cowra, Australia. Almost
immediately, more than 900 Japanese
prisoners of war rushed from their
living quarters, which they had set on
fire, and ran for the barbed wire fences.
Most of them were armed with an assortment
of hand-made weapons, which ranged from
improvised bats and clubs studded with nails
to crude swords fashioned from dismantled
bread-cutters and knives stolen from kitchens
and mess halls. Using gloves and pieces of cloth
to protect their hands and bodies, the inmates
climbed over the fences with the help of ropes
that they had manufactured from rice sacks.
Blankets and towels were then thrown over the
wires to facilitate the cross over. Despite the use
of their rifles and machine guns, the Australians
were incapable of stopping the Japanese and
hundreds broke through the camp’s wire system.
At daybreak, search parties began rounding up
the escapees. All 378 of them were recaptured
in the days that followed the incident. In the
end, 234 Japanese prisoners of war were killed
and 108 were wounded. Four Australian guards
were killed, two of them posthumously awarded
the George Cross for outstanding gallantry and
devotion to duty, and four others suffered severe
wounds. An Australian military court of inquiry
concluded several weeks later that the Cowra
mass escape attempt had been premeditated

and that the objective of the prisoners
was to overthrow the camp and commit
mass suicide.1
German POWs planned a similar mass
escape in Canada. This little-known
incident is almost completely ignored
in the historiography. In early October
1944, Canadian intelligence officers at
POW Camp No.44 Grande Ligne, in southern
Quebec, learned that a secret organization known
as the HARIKARI Club had been created by some
of the camp’s more ardent Nazi sympathizers.
Their goal was to prepare a suicidal mass escape
that promised to wreak havoc on the region
surrounding the camp. They sought to break
free in order to slaughter as many Canadians
and inflict as much sabotage and destruction as
possible before being killed. This rampage was
to be launched as soon as the Nazi prisoners
regarded the war as absolutely lost or in the
event of Germany’s unconditional surrender.
Taking the threat very seriously, the camp staff
began preparing for the worst. Reinforcements
were brought in, requests were made for new
weapons and equipment, the camp’s wire system
was strengthened, defensive positions were built
in the vicinity of the camp, and precautionary
plans were devised to neutralize the inmates in
the event they launched their suicidal attack.
Although the HARIKARI Club was dismantled
several months later and the dreaded mass
escape attempt never occurred, this incident
proved how Nazism remained a powerful force

© Canadian Military History, Volume 13, Number 3, Summer 2004, pp.49-67.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004

49
1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 5

in Canadian POW camps in the last months of
the Second World War. It also showed how well
German POWs were organized behind Canadian
barbed wire. This article will examine the rise
of the HARIKARI Club and the measures taken
by Canadian military authorities to counter the
threat it posed.
POW Camp No.44 was located in the small
village of Grande Ligne near Napierville in
southern Quebec, less than 50 kilometers away
from Montreal and close to the United States
border. It was part of a complex network of
internment facilities located across Canada
where approximately 34,000 German POW
were detained during the Second World War.2
Its origins date from early September 1942
when officials from the Department of National
Defence (DND) Directorate of Prisoners of
War, investigated the possibility of building an
internment camp in Quebec specifically suited
for German POW officers.3 According to the 1929
Geneva Convention, captured enemy officers
were to be segregated from non-commissioned
officers and other ranks, and were to be treated
with due regard to their rank and age.4 This
implied that special facilities had to be created
by all belligerents for the incarceration of POW
officers. At the time, Canada operated two such
camps in Ontario: No.20 in Gravenhurst and
No.30 in Bowmanville. Because these internment
facilities became increasingly overcrowded, the
construction of a new POW officer camp became
necessary.5
Representatives from Military District 4
(M.D.4) headquarters in Montreal, which was
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in charge of internment operations in Quebec,
were given the difficult task of finding a suitable
location for this new POW officer camp. Several
properties were considered, including two hotel
complexes in the Laurentians and a Golf Club at
Beaconsfield.6 M.D.4 officials also inquired into
the possibility of using the Grande Ligne Mission’s
Feller Institute premises, which then served as
a residential school for young men. It consisted
of a U-shaped four-story stone building, a brick
gymnasium, eight frame houses, a large barn, and
numerous smaller buildings with approximately
240 acres of land.7 M.D.4 found the site suitable,
and negotiations were immediately undertaken
between the Privy Council Office and the Grande
Ligne Mission. An agreement ensued on 24
November 1942 whereby the Mission agreed to
lease its property to the Canadian government
for the sum of $15,000 per year.8
M.D.4 headquarters took over the site on 15
January 1943 and immediately began converting
it into a proper internment facility.9 It took nearly
five months to build the camp. Wire fences
and guard towers were erected and existing
buildings were renovated under difficult winter
conditions. But when Swiss representatives
inspected the completed camp on behalf of the
German authorities on 16 June 1943, they found
the installations to be highly satisfactory.10 As
the Consul General of Switzerland in Canada
reported:
I was deeply impressed by the work undertaken
in order to adapt perfectly the existing buildings
and annexes to the new purpose. I think that,
in spite of the natural difficulties due to the
very hard winter and conditions prevailing in

Prisoner of War Camp
No.44 Grande Ligne,
Quebec.
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wartime, the Canadian authorities have done
splendid work on this place and I have no
doubt that the new camp will be on the same
level, in the way of comfort and facilities, as the
Bowmanville officers’ camp, which is universally
regarded as being an outstanding place of
internment.11

After receiving this vote of confidence, within
the next week, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric D.B.
Kippen (camp commandant) and his staff of
approximately 250 guardsmen from the Veterans’
Guard of Canada (VGC) prepared for the coming
of the German prisoners.12
The camp opened on 28 June 1943 with
the arrival of 467 Germans who had been
temporarily transferred to POW Camp No.40
Farnham, Quebec, in early December 1942
because of severe overcrowding at Bowmanville
and Gravenhurst. Most of them were Luftwaffe
pilots and aircrew shot down during the Battle of
Britain and Kriegsmarine seamen captured on
naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean and the
North Sea.13 Between July 1943 and February
1944, approximately 250 additional German
POW were sent to Grande Ligne; many had been
captured in North Africa and Italy.14 By early
October 1944, when camp authorities learned
of the HARIKARI Club scheme, the total POW
population in the camp numbered 713.15
Nazism proved extremely popular at Grande
Ligne. German POW officers, especially the
younger ones who had been subject to years
of exposure to Nazi propaganda, expressed a
strong sense of loyalty to Adolf Hitler and the
Nazi regime. Even in captivity, they continued
to display great pride in the military strength
and conquests of the Third Reich. Because they
believed Canada would someday be invaded by
German armed forces and become a colony of
Nazi Germany, many German officers worked
to keep the Nazi spirit alive inside the camp.
Canadian authorities perceived this as a serious
problem. Of particular concern was the fact that
Nazi sympathizers, aside from being arrogant
and defiant, had a tendency to be extremely
aggressive, especially against prisoners who
expressed anti-Nazi sentiments. They were also
very well organized. They had their own Gestapo,
propaganda, and intelligence sections as well as
an escape committee, all of which operated in
utmost secrecy.16

The Gestapo section had the task of making
sure that Nazism remained the dominant force
inside the camp’s enclosure. This was done
through acts of intimidation and violence.
Members of the camp Gestapo spied on fellow
inmates and used strong-arm methods to
alienate and terrorize anti-Nazis. Prisoners who
cooperated with the Canadian authorities were
often subjected to kangaroo courts, where they
were judged as ‘traitors’ and usually beaten. The
Gestapo section also gathered an impressive
arsenal of clubs, knives, and other hand-made
weapons. Beatings, death threats, and other
acts of brutality usually occurred at night and
in remote parts of the camp so as to prevent
detection by the guards. Victims occasionally
had to be segregated from the rest of the inmate
population by camp authorities and held in
protective custody. So successful were the actions
of the camp Gestapo that very few prisoners dared
openly to express their anti-Nazi sentiments.17
The propaganda section’s mission was
to educate fellow prisoners along Nazi lines.
Its members organized Nazi celebrations and
fabricated and distributed Nazi regalia and
literature. They also administered an impressive
Nazi training program known as NAPOLA (Nazi
Political Learning), whose purpose was to keep
POW officers as well trained and thoroughly
indoctrinated as possible. Emphasis was
placed on the maintenance of a strong German
sentiment, the dissemination of Nazi doctrines,
and the fostering of martial attitudes. NAPOLA
training consisted of a series of secret lectures
and seminars on topics such as Nazism, German
history, political geography, military science,
intelligence, map reading, and battlefield
leadership. It not only permitted German officers
to reaffirm their commitment to the Nazi cause,
it also gave them an opportunity to test their
military skills and knowledge of war.18
The purpose of the intelligence section was
to obtain vital information on the progression
of the war overseas, the military efforts of the
Allied powers, the state of the Canadian home
front, and the condition of German POWs in
Canada. Data was collected through a variety
of means, the most important being a secret
hand-made radio receiver built from tin cans,
pieces of wire, aluminum foil, and the amplifier
of a record player.19 It allowed members of the
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German prisoners of war arrive at the train station in Quebec City, July 1940. This group primarily
contains German officers from the Kriegsmarine (navy), Luftwaffe (air force) and Heer (army).

The goal of the escape committee, as the
name indicates, was to plan escapes. German
POWs saw it as their military duty to try to break
free and return to Germany. They knew that
preventing getaways was a tiresome enterprise for
camp guards, who constantly had to be alert and
vigilant, and that it forced detaining powers to
deploy more men for the protection of internment
camps. Members of the committee built tunnels,
impersonated VGC guards, and helped fellow
prisoners break away by jumping over fences
or cutting through them.22 To facilitate such
endeavors, they fabricated tools and gathered
all sorts of evasion materials, some of which
arrived in the camp hidden in German Red Cross
parcels. These included, for example, complete

VGC uniforms with wedge caps and badges made
of tin; camouflage suits and civilian clothing
made from blankets; hand-made sandbags;
wire cutters, compasses, saws, and other tools;
daggers; falsified documents of American,
Argentine, British, Canadian, Dutch, Latvian,
and other origins; diagrams for assembling
radio transmitters; code books; escape diaries;
Canadian currency; as well as maps of eastern
Canada and the United States. Camp authorities
even found charts of American and Canadian
airports and the detailed plan of a Douglas DC
3 transport aircraft during an extensive search
of the POW compound in September 1944.23
The escape committee also worked in
close cooperation with the intelligence section.
Understanding how virtually impossible it was
for German POW to break free successfully from
North American internment camps and return to
Europe, members of the committee deliberately
planned and coordinated escapes to provide
the intelligence section with useful data on the
Canadian home front and the area surrounding
the camp. Acting as spies, escapees were to be
on the lookout for bridges, factories, railways,
airfields, and other sites important to the
Canadian war effort. This information was then
transmitted to the intelligence section following
recapture.24

NAC PA 166252

Intelligence section to listen to American, British,
Canadian, and even German radio broadcasts
and to remain abreast of international events.
The inmates also attempted on several occasions
to use the camp mail system to transmit valuable
information to Nazi Germany. To avoid detection
by Canadian censors, letters were encoded or
written in various types of ‘invisible inks’ made
from milk, oranges, potatoes, urine, and other
natural products.20 Furthermore, the intelligence
section kept detailed records of the movements of
camp guards and the number of trains arriving
at the local railway station.21
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The first escapee to be used as a spy was
Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Hugo Foerester.
The incident occurred at Camp Farnham on 28
June 1943, several hours before the transfer of
the camp’s POW population to Grande Ligne.25
Before being recaptured by the Quebec Provincial
Police the next day, Foerester was able to carry out
a reconnaissance of Dorval airport in Montreal.
Upon his arrival at Grande Ligne, Foerester
immediately reported his findings to members
of the Intelligence section.26 Another successful
attempt occurred on 13 September 1944 when
Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Gerhard Wanckel
escaped from Grande Ligne and reached the
United States by walking along the Richelieu
River. He was caught the next day near Rouses
Point, New York after having conducted a
reconnaissance of the region. Wanckel’s recapture
provided the intelligence section with additional
data.27
So serious became the issue of Nazism at
Grande Ligne and several other POW camps
that, in the summer of 1944, the Directorate of
Prisoners of War felt compelled to completely
reorganize the Canadian internment operation in
order to segregate Nazi inmates from anti-Nazis.
For this purpose, on 5 August 1944, the Canadian

Psychological Warfare Committee introduced
a special POW classification system known as
PHERUDA.28 In conformity with this new scheme,
German prisoners were interrogated by camp
intelligence officers and Military Intelligence 7
(M.I.7) agents and classed in three categories:
‘Black’ (pro-Nazis), ‘Grey’ (no strong political
convictions) and ‘White’ (anti-Nazis). Each
Canadian POW camp was assigned a specific
group of prisoners. Because of the already wellestablished popularity of Nazism at Grande
Ligne, that camp was chosen for the incarceration
of ‘Black’ prisoners.29
Nothing reflected more on the dominance of
Nazism at Grande Ligne than the establishment
of the HARIKARI Club. The D-Day landings of
6 June 1944 had a tremendous impact on the
POWs. The realization that Allied military forces
might soon crush Nazi Germany, combined with
feelings of anger and uselessness, incited the
Nazis to become more ruthless and rabid.30 The
HARIKARI Club was created in the early summer
of 1944 by some of these POW as a means of
continuing the war behind Canadian barbed
wire. Although not much is known about the
roots of this secret organization, we do know
that it operated under the chairmanship of three

German POWs are searched upon their arrival at the train station in Quebec City, July 1940.
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senior Nazi officers: Oberstleutnant (LieutenantColonel) Guenther Schemmel, Major (Major) E.C.
Von Schnorr, and Hauptmann (Captain) Rudolf
Moellerfriedrich.31 As reported by Colonel W.W.
Murray (Director of Military Intelligence), the aim
of the plot was the following:

The HARIKARI Club…is based on the old
German ‘Twilight of the Gods’ (Gotterdaemerung) philosophy-mythology, wherein the Gods
kill off each other in a final orgy of violence.
The HARIKARI plan will go into operation when
it becomes obvious that the capitulation or
destruction of the German Army is imminent
and a negotiated peace is beyond hope. When
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the right moment is decided on by the HARIKARI
leaders, members will proceed to murder all
fellow POW whom they consider to be ‘cowards’
because of their anti-Nazi sentiments. The
HARIKARI POW will then rush some or all of the
guard towers, regardless of cost to themselves,
and break out of the enclosure. Some will
proceed to murder as many of the Camp Staff
as possible. In this connection, the Camp
Commandant, Camp Intelligence Officer and
Camp Sergeant-Major have been singled out for
special attention at Grande Ligne. Others will
head for the nearest plants, industrial areas,
airports, etc., to commit as much damage and
sabotage as possible. Their final aim is as much
murder and destruction as possible before they
themselves are killed. It must be realized that
the POW officers involved in the HARIKARI Club
are fully aware that a number of innocent people
will be killed and that most or all of them will
be killed. Nevertheless, their Nazi minds are so
transfixed by the Gotterdaemerung idea that
their only thought is to go to their deaths in a
final blaze of glory, taking as many of the enemy,
and as much of his property, as possible with
them to destruction.32

Camp authorities learned of the HARIKARI
Club on 3 October 1944. In a letter addressed
to camp intelligence officers, German civilian
internee Georg Felber, the camp’s Roman
Catholic priest, informed camp officials about
the existence of this secret Nazi organization.
For several months, Felber and his Catholic
followers had been persecuted by anti-Christian
Nazi sympathizers, which included several
members of this so-called HARIKARI Club. Tired
of the harassment and fearing for his life, Felber
decided to tell the Canadian authorities about
the ‘Black’ prisoners’ clandestine activities. In
his letter, he warned the camp staff of the true
purpose of the HARIKARI Club, which was the
preparation of a suicidal mass escape attempt
that was to be launched as soon as the Nazi
POWs regarded the war as absolutely lost, which
Felber expected to be very soon.33 He, therefore,
requested the immediate dismantlement of
the HARIKARI Club, emphasizing that “it must
be done with extreme care and skill, because
otherwise the HARIKARI Club would begin the
attack.” His solution was to close the camp
altogether and divide the prisoner population by
transferring it to different internment facilities.
Felber also gave the Canadian authorities a list of
the ringleaders and other dangerous prisoners.
It included some 100 names.34

The revelations concerning the HARIKARI
Club took camp authorities by surprise. Although
VGC guards had been aware for several months
that the inmates were preparing something,
they had no idea what it was. As a Canadian
intelligence officer admitted after learning of the
existence of the HARIKARI Club:
We have been aware for some months of the
aggressiveness of Nazi officers in Camp No.44.
The fact that they have an Intelligence section,
which has obtained a mass of information on
railroads, bridges, and airports in the Montreal
area and upper New York State, has been known
for some time. Also, that an escaped POW officer
carried out a reconnaissance of Dorval airport
and reported back to camp intelligence is past
history.35

Nobody, however, expected that the prisoners
might use this information for the preparation of a
suicidal mass escape plot. As camp commandant
Kippen noted, the existence of the HARIKARI
Club “indicates a new line of action by the POW
and is a result of the lost German cause.”36 Had
it not been for Felber, camp authorities might
never have learned about the existence of the
HARIKARI Club.
Almost immediately, camp officials began
preparing for the worst. On 4 October, Kippen sent
a copy of Felber’s letter to M.D.4 headquarters
and the Directorate of Prisoners of War. He also
warned the entire camp staff of the possible
danger of a HARIKARI Club attack and made
arrangements to strengthen security inside the
camp. At the time, 12 officers and 270 guards
from No.40 Company VGC were stationed
at Grande Ligne. 37 A change of command
was instituted the next day with LieutenantColonel H.W. Hiltz replacing Kippen as camp
commandant, a decision that had been lingering
since 20 September and had supposedly nothing
to do with the HARIKARI Club affair.38
To confirm the authenticity of Felber’s story,
a ‘White’ German Army Oberstleutnant named
Alois Frank was interrogated on 12 October 1944
while in Montreal for an eye treatment. A staunch
anti-Nazi, Frank assured camp officials that “the
HARIKARI Club is authentic” and that it was “more
serious than realized.” He gave a detailed account
of the Nazi organization’s aims and provided a
list of some of its targets, which included the
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German prisoners of war relax in a reading lounge at Camp Grande Ligne.

munitions dumps at l’Acadie and the St. Jean
airport, where the British Commonwealth Air
Training Plan (B.C.A.T.P.) No.9 Air Observation
School was located and where a great number
of military aircraft were concentrated. Both
sites were situated approximately ten kilometers
from the camp. Frank also confirmed the
camp authorities’ suspicions that the German
POW operated a secret hand-made radio
receiver. Canadian authorities perceived this
as a serious problem since it meant that the
inmates could know the exact date of Germany’s
capitulation and at this point initiate their own
Gotterdaemerung. Frank then furnished camp
officials with a list of HARIKARI Club members.
It was fairly identical to that provided by Felber
and registered approximately 100 names. Frank
explained that as a former Bavarian police
prefect, he knew many of the prisoners on that list
prior to the outbreak of the war and was aware
of their Nazi antecedents. To avoid bloodshed
and destruction, he recommended the removal
of these bad elements from the camp as soon
as possible.39 Because of his determination to

help camp authorities eradicate the HARIKARI
Club, Frank refused the offer to be sent to
another internment camp. In his opinion, “there
was much more work for him to do within the
enclosure” as an informant “so that the camp
staff can be advised of the latest information and
also of any matter which may be considered of
great urgency.“ Felber, on the other hand, was
transferred to the camp at Farnham later that
month.40
The HARIKARI Club affair was taken very
seriously at DND. The incident that occurred two
months earlier at Cowra in Australia had shown
the level of devastation that could result from a
suicidal mass escape attempt. National Defence
Headquarters officials in Ottawa understood
the destructive impact that a similar endeavor
could have on the Canadian home front. The
proximity of Grande Ligne to Montreal and
other urban centers, where important industrial
plants, shipyards, military installations, and
transport establishments (dockyards, railways,
airports, etc.) were located, made the HARIKARI
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Club scheme all the more threatening. Attacks
against such facilities could seriously affect the
Canadian war effort and cause heavy losses of life.
Precautionary measures were therefore urgently
required to protect the region and its population.
Several days after the interrogation of Alois
Frank, representatives from the Directorates
of Prisoners of War, Military intelligence, and
Veterans’ Guard of Canada began investigating
the HARIKARI Club situation. All of them were
concerned with security arrangements in the
camp, the greatest worry being how to combat a
HARIKARI Club attack should it ever happen.
The Directorate of Prisoners of War was
particularly interested in the level of readiness
of the camp staff. On 17 October 1944,
Lieutenant-Colonel H.W. Pearson was sent to
M.D.4 headquarters in Montreal to discuss the
Grande Ligne prisoners’ mass escape scheme and
oversee some of the measures taken to protect
the camp. That same day, Pearson accompanied
several M.D.4 and M.I.7 officers on a visit to the
camp. The commandant, Hiltz, then informed
him that “he was quite able to meet any situation
that might arise so long as present conditions
were unchanged” but that “he might need
additional guard troops as a reserve in the event
of insubordination.” In his report to Colonel H.N.
Streight (Director of Prisoners of War), Pearson
concluded that such a mass suicide effort was
quite possible and that reinforcements should
be ready in the advent of trouble.41 Streight
complied with Pearson’s request and authorized
the immediate mobilization of a reserve force
of three platoons from No.10 Company, VGC
stationed at Camp Farnham. These troops were to
be placed at the disposal of M.D.4 headquarters.
Streight felt very confident in the VGC’s ability
to cope with a possible mass escape attempt. He
also believed that the surrounding landscape
would be of advantage to the guardsmen. “The
country adjacent to the camp is open, flat farm
land where concealment is quite difficult,” he
emphasized. “Past experience has shown that
recapture becomes very much more difficult if
escaped POW can take concealment in densely
wooded areas.”42
The Directorate of Military Intelligence, on the
other hand, was more concerned. On 17 October,
Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Acland held several
telephone conversations about the HARIKARI
Club with M.I.7 and camp intelligence officers

as well as former camp commandant Kippen.
Based on the information he received, Acland
concluded in a report that such a mass suicide
effort was quite possible and that, should it
occur, “a considerable number of German POW
officers will be shot with perhaps unfortunate
repercussions on our own POW in Germany;
some of the camp staff will be killed; and some
of the Nazis will succeed in breaking out and in
reaching vulnerable objectives such as the Dorval
and St. Hubert air fields.” Because of the camp’s
proximity to Montreal, Acland suggested that
Grande Ligne no longer be used for the detention
of ‘Blacks’ and that HARIKARI Club members be
immediately transferred. As he explained:
The danger of continuing to allow the present
rabid clique of Nazi officers to remain at Grande
Ligne becomes increasingly more apparent…It
must be considered that any ‘Black’ officer camp
will be a first rate security problem and therefore
the locating of such a camp near a metropolitan
area or communications center, as is the case
of Grande Ligne…is not concurred in from the
security aspect.43

Anxious to discuss the possibility of moving
the camp’s ‘Blacks’ to a new ‘Black’ officer camp,
Acland arranged an M.I.7 meeting on 20 October,
which was attended by Lieutenant-Colonel
Pearson of the Directorate of Prisoners of War.
Most intelligence officers agreed with Acland’s
proposal. They even provided a list of potential
internment camps to replace Grande Ligne:
No.33, Petawawa; No.101, Angler, Ontario; No.70,
Fredericton, New Brunswick; and No.130, Seebee
(formerly Kananaskis), Alberta. Pearson, on the
other hand, emphasized that the segregation of
the POWs was the responsibility of the Chiefs of
the General Staff and “it therefore follows that the
General Staff should recommend or suggest the
camp which should be used, keeping in mind, in
view of the situation in Camp No.44, security of
industry and Army and Air establishments within
a reasonable area of the internment camp.”44
Colonel Streight concurred with this view. “The
question of establishing a ‘Black’ camp for officer
POW,” he explained, “is one that should not be
hastily answered. Up to the present, attempts
towards segregation have accomplished little of a
constructive nature and have added substantially
to the confusion and unrest amongst POW. It is
my opinion that the number of POW to be found
in Camp No.44 who are not either ‘Black’ or ‘Dark
Grey’ is almost negligible.”45
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The Directorate Veterans’ Guard of Canada
was preoccupied with the protection of VGC
personnel. Following a visit to M.D.4 headquarters
and Camp Grande Ligne on 19 October, Colonel
C.P. Lavigne (Assistant Adjutant- General,
Directorate Veteran’s Guard of Canada), sent a
memorandum to Colonel J.M. Taylor (Director
Veterans’ Guard of Canada) in which he suggested
that the VGC guardsmen be completely reequipped. Among the items requested were a
wheeled armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) and a
universal carrier. As he explained: “The A.F.V.
could be used inside the camp’s enclosure while
the universal carrier would be useful to follow
escapees over fields.” Lavigne also recommended
that the camp be provided with six Vickers heavy
machine guns, seven portable No.58 radio sets, a
supply of tear gas, grenades, plus a good quantity
of parachute flares and pistol grip lights to be
used in the event of an electrical breakdown.
He also requested that the British Mk-II steel
helmets issued to camp guards be replaced with
the American M-1, which could “afford greater
protection against clubs, stones, etc.”46 Taylor,
however, refused most of the items recommended
by Lavigne:
It is respectfully suggested that the POW
personnel of this camp remain as at present,
and in addition to, or in place of Vickers machine
guns…which the VGC are not trained in the use
of, that sufficient Reising sub-machine guns
be made available to place two in each tower
instead of one as at present. That tear gas be not
supplied, but instead fire hose might be used to
rout the POW out of buildings. That an adequate
supply of flash and pistol grip lights be kept
on hand; and that a supply of wood clubs, say
from 2 to 2½ feet in length, be on hand for close
combat skirmishing, inside buildings, where it
is not possible to use bayonets.47

Evidently, Taylor was not as apprehensive
of the HARIKARI Club as Lavigne and seemed
to believe that a suicidal attack could be quelled
in the same manner and with the same tools
and weapons as the Bowmanville Riot on 10-12
October 1942, the only serious POW revolt in
a Canadian internment camp during the war.
Taylor, then commandant of Camp Bowmanville,
suppressed the riot with the help of 400 Canadian
soldiers armed only with unloaded rifles with
fixed bayonets, hardwood clubs, and highpressure fire hoses. Approximately 80 Germans
and 20 Canadians suffered injuries during the
so-called “Battle of Bowmanville.” Interestingly,

many of the ringleaders were transferred to
Farnham in early December 1942 and then to
Grande Ligne a few months later.48 In the end,
Taylor’s comments did not prevent the arrival at
Grande Ligne in late October of No.69 grenades,
tear gas generators, Bren light machine guns, as
well as other supplies.49
It late November, military authorities turned
their attention to the protection of the region
and its civilian population, and informed the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about
the existence of the HARIKARI Club. The threat
of sabotage to essential home front installations
and the possible danger to civil life and property
was taken very seriously by the RCMP On 29
November, Deputy Commissioner F.J. Mead went
to Montreal to discuss the HARIKARI Club threat
with M.D.4 officials. Meeting with Major-General
E.J. Renaud (District Officer Commanding
M.D.4) and camp commandant Hiltz, he became
impressed with the seriousness of the situation
and expressed great concern with the danger of
sabotage to the important electric power plants
at Cèdres and Beauharnois. In the end, all agreed
that something serious might soon happen and
that measures needed to be immediately taken
to counter the threat.50 Deputy Commissioner
Mead then visited ‘C’ Division headquarters,
RCMP in Montreal, where he met with Glen
Bethel of the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Commissioner S.T. Wood,
and other members of the RCMP. They agreed that
there would be the fullest cooperation between
the RCMP and M.D.4 authorities and to prepare
precautionary plans. Deputy Commissioner F.J.
Harvison of ‘C’ Division, RCMP, was sent the next
morning to M.D.4 headquarters to work with
Renaud and his officers to prepare detailed plans
and operational orders to be issued as quickly
as possible.51 In the meantime, RCMP and M.D.4
officials recommended, as a precautionary
measure, that additional VGC troops be based in
the region. Two platoons from No.12 Company,
VGC, originally stationed at POW Camp No.23
Monteith, Ontario, arrived as reinforcements
at St. Jean, Quebec, in the late afternoon of 1
December. Their task was to protect the civilians
living in the vicinity of the camp in the event of a
possible breakout.52
Although urgent requests to segregate
the camp compound had been issued by the
Directorate of Military Intelligence and Camp
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Grande Ligne officers, higher authorities
remained hesitant. The reason was that no one
understood if POWs in other camps knew of the
HARIKARI Club’s existence or if similar Nazi
organizations had been established in other
internment centers. There was the dual possibility
that transferring HARIKARI Club leaders might
provoke the other ‘Black’ prisoners to initiate
the suicide process or trigger the rise of similar
groups in other camps.53 The situation began
to change on 1 December, when Major-General
Renaud urged DND to move all ‘Blacks’ out of the
district and recommended that another camp be
chosen for the incarceration of such prisoners.
His argument was that ‘Black’ internment
camps should not be located near urbanized,
industrialized, and densely populated areas, as
was the case with Grande Ligne. Instead, they
should be established in isolated regions as far
removed as possible from vulnerable points. His
reasons:

and was particularly concerned with the serious
implications of a possible ‘break out’ at Grande
Ligne. McNaughton made it abundantly clear
that the fullest cooperation should continue
between military authorities and the RCMP,
which was responsible for the protection of
civilians.56 An arrangement was formalized with
Commissioner Wood, whereby the RCMP agreed
to supply a liaison officer to DND to enhance
cooperation.57 Their greatest concern, however,
was the question of transferring approximately
100 ‘Black’ HARIKARI Club members to another
suitable ‘Black’ camp. After much discussion,
McNaughton ordered that “an absolute secure
prisoner of war camp be prepared at once to
hold from 200 to 250 officers, so that it can be
used if it is decided to remove the leaders from
Grande Ligne” and also that “full standards of
accommodation for officers under the Geneva
Convention be observed in order to prevent
reprisals in Germany.”58

(A) The density of the civil population in the
neighboring area; (B) The proximity of Grande
Ligne to Montreal District where a considerable
number of factories are employed on war work;
(C) The easy access to power plants such as
Beauharnois, Cèdres, Black River and even
Shawinigan, the damage of which would cause
great harm to the war effort; (D) The number
of airports in the neighborhood – St. Jean, St.
Hubert, Dorval; (E) The proximity to ammunition
dumps at L’Acadie and Delson; (F) The difficulty
of providing immediate trained reinforcements
due to lack of troops in the vicinity. This is
particularly so in the winter months when roads
to Grande Ligne may become snowbound. 54

Although it was pointed out that there
was no vacant camp immediately available, all
agreed that the most suitable camp was located
at Seebee, Alberta. The advantage with this
internment facility was that it was fairly isolated
in the Rocky Mountains and far from major
urban centers or military installations. Escapes
would, therefore, be of almost no threat to the
security of the home front. It was proposed for
such reasons to use Seebee as a ‘Super Black’
camp for the accommodation of ‘Black’ German
officers from all of Canada’s POW camps. The
problem then became where to transfer the 460
German officers and 156 other ranks currently
interned at Seebee. After much discussion, it
was decided that the most practical solution,
with the necessary requirements of security and
speed, was the conversion of the then vacant
army training center at Wainright, Alberta,
which could be used as a POW camp to hold
approximately 700 officers and 200 other ranks.
The drawback was that it would take between six
weeks and two months to make the Wainright
facilities sufficiently secure. In the end, it was
agreed to obtain the concurrence of the general
staff as to the availability of the Wainright
training center, to make arrangements with the
Quartermaster-General for construction and
plans for the conversion, and to immediately
select a commanding officer and the personnel
required for the proper administration and
security of this new camp. In the meantime, it

Although Renaud emphasized that all
possible precautionary measures had already
been taken and that the situation was well in
hand, he did warn about the rapidity with which
a HARIKARI Club attack might occur and the
difficulties which might be encountered by VGC
troops if such a scenario ever happened. He
was particularly concerned with the older age of
VGC guards as well as their poor equipment.55
General A.G.L. McNaughton (Minister of National
Defence) was immediately made aware of the
necessity to transfer the ‘Black’ prisoners.
On the morning of 2 December, McNaughton
discussed the HARIKARI Club threat with top
rank DND and RCMP officials. He noted that
Louis St. Laurent (Minister of Justice) had been
briefed on the HARIKARI Club by the RCMP
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General A.G.L. McNaughton,
minister of national defence, was
quite concerned about the possible
actions of the “HARIKARI club”
and ordered that all necessary
steps be taken to prevent it from
happening.

was decided to keep the eventual transfer of the
‘Black’ inmates a secret.59
On 4 December, the Chiefs of the General
Staff discussed the transfer of HARIKARI Club
members to Seebee. Lieutenant-General J.C.
Murchie (Chief of the General Staff) “directed that
the hutted accommodation at Wainright would be
made immediately available as accommodation
for POW removed from Seebee so that in turn
the latter could be used to hold officer POW
removed from Grande Ligne.” He emphasized
that the transfer of the ‘Black’ inmates would have
to wait until the construction of the new camp,
designated No.135, at Wainright was complete.
Only at that time would Grande Ligne no longer
be used for the internment of ‘Blacks.’60 It was
now only a matter of time before Canadian
authorities could attempt to dismantle the
HARIKARI Club.
In the meantime, M.D.4 completed the
strengthening of the camp’s security system,

which had begun a month
earlier. Guard towers were
reinforced, additional
firearms were supplied, a
plentiful quantity of pistolgrip spotlights and ground
flares were furnished,
additional flood lights,
searchlights and other
lighting equipment were
installed, new barbed wire
entanglements were erected,
and six machine gun posts
were established at strategic
points around the camp with
weapons facing towards the
enclosure.61 Additional VGC
troops, “to the limit of the
capacity of the barracks,”
were stationed in the camp.
Reserve VGC forces were
also standing by at St. Jean
and Farnham. According to
operational orders devised
by M.D.4 and the RCMP, these troops were to
form a ‘recapture screen’ around the camp area
in the advent of a mass escape. They were to
protect all bridges and railway stations leading
to Montreal and intercept all civilian traffic on
nearby roads. An agreement was even made
with the Canadian National Railway (CNR) and
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) to permit VGC
troops to examine all freight trains passing
through the region. Men from these units
were also to protect vital industrial plants as
well as the Beauharnois and Cèdres electric
powerhouses, where “considerable sabotage
could be carried out without explosives and other
sabotage equipment.” Damage to these two power
plants, it was believed, “would seriously affect
all industries in the Montreal area” and cause
delays in war production. It is important to note
that VGC guardsmen were to be assisted in their
duties around the region by RCMP personnel.
Arrangements were also made with the BCATP
No.9 Air Observation School at St. Jean for
military aircraft, which were to be used for aerial
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reconnaissance and for observing the movements
of escapees. The Quebec Provincial Police, the
New York and Vermont State Police, the FBI, and
the United States Border Patrol were also to be
notified. Canadian army units were only to be
used if VGC and RCMP personnel proved unable
to control the situation.62
To coordinate a possible recapture operation,
a temporary headquarters, commonly referred
to as “Bleak House,” was established in a vacant
building located about one kilometer away from
Grande Ligne on the main road leading to the
camp. The house also served as a temporary
barrack for two well-armed VGC platoons and
for four RCMP constables. As outlined in the
operational orders:
The first duty of these troops will be to assist
the troops at the camp in preventing any actual
escape, but the moment an escape occurs, or
it appears probable that an attempt may be
successful these men will take up previously
assigned positions to protect the civilians in the
neighborhood of the camp. There are twenty-five
houses in the immediate vicinity of the camp.
It is planned to place one Sten sub-machine
gun equipped man in each house to remain on
duty until relieved, or until instructed that the
danger period has passed. They will be under
the control of officers picked for this duty who
will be working closely with the RCMP personnel
also stationed at ‘Bleak House.’…In discussing
the protection of civilians, consideration was
given the danger of unduly alarming these
people. It was decided that advance warning
would not be advisable, but that all Army and
RCMP personnel visiting the houses should be
French-speaking. It is considered advisable to
merely tell the householders that there have been
some escapes and to volunteer to safeguard the
houses – rather than to handle the approach in
a manner that would greatly upset and alarm
householders. Constant patrols by Army officers
and RCMP personnel would then make sure that
proper precautionary measures were in effect at
each house.63

To ensure that the Canadians benefited
from a proper communication system in case
prisoners cut telephone lines, radio transmitting
and receiving equipment was installed at Camp
Grande Ligne, at ‘Bleak House,’ and at M.D.4
headquarters. A First Aid station was also set up
in the ‘Bleak House.’ In the meantime, the RCMP
began preparing copies of photographs that had
been taken of all prisoners upon their arrival in
Canada for distribution to newspapers, bridge

guards, and other civilian authorities to facilitate
recapture.64
The HARIKARI Club scheme and the fears
it generated had a considerable impact on the
Canadian government’s refusal to accept a
British request made in December 1944 that
50,000 additional German POW be interned
in Canada. Since D-Day, British and Canadian
forces had captured German soldiers in the
tens of thousands. The Canadians, for instance,
detained more than 66,000 German POW in
Northwest Europe alone by early December.
This was an enormous number compared to
the 34,000 German POW already being held in
Canada.65 It appeared for this reason that Canada
was not bearing its full share of the POW burden.
At the time, the United Kingdom and the United
States each detained more than 300,000 German
POWs.66 London, therefore, hoped that Ottawa
could help alleviate the POW accommodation
problem in Northwest Europe. The Canadian
War Cabinet refused the British request on 11
December. Although the manpower crisis that
prevailed in Canada and the introduction of
conscription for overseas service in November
1944 served as an excuse, the aggressive nature
of the German POW in Canada, especially those at
Grande Ligne, seemed to have had a much greater
role to play in that decision.67 As Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King wrote in his diary
that same day: “Cabinet decided not to increase
the number [of German POWs in Canada]…
because those we have are a real menace. We have
not sufficient adequate protection for them and
there is reason to believe they are forming suicide
squads which may cause great trouble later on.”68
Although Grande Ligne was the only internment
facility in Canada where a suicidal mass escape
was being planned, the threat still seemed serious
enough to attract the Prime Minister’s attention.
On 30 December, an incident occurred
which alarmed Canadian military authorities
and confirmed the seriousness of the HARIKARI
Club plot. The scare began when VGC guardsmen
involved in a routine inspection of the POW living
quarters found an anonymous letter addressed
to the camp commandant warning him about
the preparation of an “act of grave violence and
destruction” by some of the camp’s inmates.
Unaware that the camp staff already knew about
the HARIKARI Club, the author of the note,
61
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In light of these revelations, Canadian
military officials became certain that HARIKARI
Club members planned an escape at the earliest
possible moment. On 3 January 1945, four
RCMP intelligence officers arrived in the region.
One of them was stationed in the camp while
the others were assigned to ‘Bleak House.’70 The
Directorate of Prisoners of War also informed
the commandants of each Canadian POW camp
about the situation at Grande Ligne. All were
asked to keep a vigilant eye for the existence
of schemes similar to the HARIKARI Club
inside their respective camps.71 Tension rose
on 6 January when a VGC guard accidentally
discharged his rifle and put a bullet through an
electric light conduit thereby creating a short in
the wire and starting a fire in the recreation hut.
Fortunately, the local fire department responded
rapidly and was able to extinguish the flames
without any serious damage. Surprisingly, none
of the HARIKARI Club leaders took advantage of
the incident to launch an escape.72
The 30 December scare made the Canadian
government all the more determined to
prevent additional German POW from being
shipped to Canada for internment purposes.
When the British authorities attempted on 16
January 1945 to “re-open the question of the
acceptance of further German POW by Canada,”
Mackenzie King left the matter in the hands of
the Minister of National Defence. Meeting with
the British High Commissioner in Canada on two
occasions, McNaughton explained “that there are
insurmountable practical difficulties here” and
that “for the time being at any rate, no further
commitments in this matter should be assumed
by the Canadian government.”73 Norman A.
Robertson (Canada’s undersecretary of State
for External Affairs), who had visited Camp
Grande Ligne on 1 December 1944,74 reiterated
McNaughton’s reasons in his official report to the
British High Commission on 22 January:
…no further commitments in this matter should
be assumed by the Canadian government…
General McNaughton said that he had to reckon
on the possibility of serious trouble with the

prisoners of war now in Canada. There is a good
deal of evidence of plans amongst the prisoners
to make demonstrations and to attempt mass
escapes. Many of the prisoners are desperate
and fanatical Nazis ready to cause trouble even
though this in effect means their committing
mass suicide. He is taking steps to reduce this
danger…But in the meantime he cannot afford
either to reduce the numbers of the guards or
to lower the quality of the men employed as
guards.75

The British government was deeply
disappointed by the Canadian decision and,
ultimately, few additional German POW were
sent to Canada.76 Instead, Canadian military
authorities concentrated their efforts on the reeducation and de-Nazification of those prisoners
already in the country.77
HARIKARI Club members were finally
transferred to the ‘Super Black’ POW Camp at
Seebee in Alberta on 6 February 1945. In order
not to agitate the prisoners and face a preemptive HARIKARI Club attack, the move was
kept secret. To instill an element of surprise, the
operation was done in the early morning hours,
when all inmates were asleep. The POWs selected
to be transferred were immediately rounded up
by armed guards and taken away along with
their belongings. In the end, the Canadians faced
no resistance whatsoever. Overall, some 236
‘Black’ inmates were transferred. The camp was
thoroughly searched that evening by RCMP and
VGC personnel. The radio receiver and numerous
evasion tools were found.78 The HARIKARI Club
threat faded away as a result of the surprise
transfer and the popularity of Nazism inside the
camp drastically diminished in the following
months. Subsequently, Grande Ligne became an
internment center for ‘Grey’ prisoners of war. The
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany on 8
May 1945 put the last nail in the coffin of Nazism
in the camp. That summer, camp intelligence
officers claimed that “confidence in the strength
and sincerity of purpose of the western world (i.e.
democracies)” had increased by 70 per cent.79
Aside from a small strike organized by some of
the remaining ‘Blacks’ to oppose the Canadian reeducation program in early August 1945, Nazism
remained relatively dead inside the camp.80

NAC PA 163786

who probably was a ‘White’ prisoner, urgently
requested the transfer of all German officers
involved in the scheme. The letter provided the
names of the most important and dangerous
ones, which included Schemmel, Schnorr, and
Moellerfriedrich.69

Interestingly, a mass escape scheme similar
to that of the HARIKARI Club was planned at
Camp Seebee by several of the younger ‘Black’
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Above: German prisoners gather around a piano at
Camp Grande Ligne. Right: Crew members of the
German submarine U-35 at Camp Grande Ligne, 1944.

inmates transferred from Grande Ligne. Most of
them used to be members of the HARIKARI Club.
According to former inmate Otto Rietdorf, who
claimed to have been quartermaster of escape
tools at Grande Ligne, the Seebee group intended
to escape and to operate as a commando or
guerilla unit to demolish bridges and dams, cut
telephone and power lines, and be as disruptive
as possible in the region. Their goal was to
instill panic in the civilian population and tie up
large numbers of Canadian troops. These young
activists’ plot was apparently dismantled by some
of the older German officers.81
The HARIKARI Club mass escape scare of
1944-1945 well demonstrated the degree of
organization of German POW officers and how
Nazism remained a powerful force in Canadian
internment camps in the last months of the
Second World War. Despite the introduction of
the PHERUDA system of POW classification in
early August 1944 and constant observation by
camp censors and intelligence officers, Canadian
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military authorities proved unable to completely
eradicate Nazi sympathies behind Canadian
barbed wire. The development of the HARIKARI
Club clearly showed the extent of this problem.
The fact that ‘Black’ inmates were preparing a
suicidal mass escape scheme which promised to
wreak havoc on the Canadian home front took
the Canadians by surprise. So intense became
the HARIKARI Club affair that the Cabinet War
Committee and the Prime Minister of Canada
were even made aware of it. Had it not been
for Georg Felber and Alois Frank, Canadian
authorities might have never known about
the existence of this plot. The discovery of the
plot awakened great consternation and raised
many questions. Why had military intelligence
been unable to detect the existence of this Nazi
organization sooner? Why Grande Ligne? Did
similar suicidal plots exist in other Canadian
internment camps? Measures adopted to counter
the threat clearly illustrate the seriousness with
which DND considered the issue. The arrival
of additional troops, weapons, and supplies in
63
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the region, the strengthening of camp security
arrangements, and the preparation of operational
orders and precautionary plans reflected military
officials’ fears.
The Grande Ligne situation also had a
considerable impact on Canada’s internment
operation. It showed the danger that ‘Black’
inmates constituted and the increasing necessity
to incarcerate them in isolated regions. The
decision to use Seebee in Alberta as a ‘Super Black’
camp served as a testimony to this new policy.
The HARIKARI Club also played an important
role in Ottawa’s refusal to incarcerate additional
German POW in Canada. In summation,
the HARIKARI Club scheme reflected the
determination of German POW to remain loyal to
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime despite military
setbacks in Europe and the increasing realization
that Germany would ultimately be defeated.
It also showed the extent to which Canadian
military authorities were determined to prevent
potentially dangerous POW from disrupting
home front activities. In the end, the HARIKARI
Club affair demonstrated how vital intelligence
and counter intelligence measures were in the
administration of Canadian POW camps.
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